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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is one of a vast number of cases filed in state and 
federal courts all over the nation seeking to hold tobacco 
companies liable for the smoking-related costs incurred by 
union health and welfare funds. The plaintiff funds allege 
that they were defrauded by the defendants--tobacco 
companies and related industry organizations--into paying 
for their participants' smoking-related illnesses, as well as 
prevented by these defendants from informing the funds' 
participants about safer smoking and smoking-cessation 
products. The defendants allegedly conspired to prevent the 
funds from obtaining and using information that would 
have reduced the incidence of smoking--and therefore of 
illness--among the funds' participants. The fraud and 
conspiracy charges are the underpinnings of plaintiffs' 
federal statutory claims, which are brought under the 
antitrust laws and the civil RICO statute. Plaintiffs also 
assert state common-law claims based on supplemental 
jurisdiction. 
 
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground that 
the claimed injuries of the plaintiff funds were too remote 
from any wrongdoing of the defendants to be redressable 
under either federal or state law. The correctness of that 
conclusion is the primary issue on this appeal. Put another 
way, we are called upon to determine whether plaintiffs 
have alleged a compensable injury proximately caused by 
defendants' allegedly fraudulent and conspiratorial conduct 
sufficient to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). This basic 
proximate cause inquiry, drawn from tort law, is 
complicated by the allegations of intentional tort, the 
packaging of plaintiffs' claims in RICO and antitrust terms, 
and the addition of state-law claims based on fraud, special 
duty, unjust enrichment, negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of warranty. In the end, we conclude that the 
District Court correctly dismissed all of plaintiffs' primary 
claims as being too remote from any alleged wrongdoing of 
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defendants, and the other claims as concomitantly lacking 





A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
This suit was brought by seven Pennsylvania-based 
union health and welfare funds (the "Funds") as a putative 
class action on behalf of all such similarly-situated funds 
against eight tobacco companies and certain industry 
organizations (collectively, the "tobacco companies")1 to 
recover for the Funds' costs of treating their participants' 
smoking-related illnesses. The suit is patterned after 
similar suits brought by state attorneys general, which were 
recently settled with the tobacco companies for more than 
$200 billion.2 See Barry Meier, Remaining States Approve 
the Pact on Tobacco Suits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1998, at A1.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The defendants include tobacco companies Philip Morris; R.J. 
Reynolds; Brown & Williamson; B.A.T. Industries; Lorillard; Liggett & 
Myers; the American Tobacco Company; and the United States Tobacco 
Company. In addition, named as defendants are the Council for Tobacco 
Research-USA; the Tobacco Institute; Smokeless Tobacco Council; and 
Hill & Knowlton, a public relations firm. 
 
2. The parties cite a large number of reported state and federal opinions 
of this genre (of both the union fund and attorney general variety), and 
have also provided us with a considerable number of unreported 
decisions. For the benefit of students of this litigation war, we list 
these 
decisions in an Appendix to this opinion. We note that in the vast 
majority of the union fund cases cited by the parties (15 of 20), at least 
some of the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed. In 11 of the 20 cases 
(including the present one), courts have dismissed the plaintiffs' entire 
case. In the only case to reach a jury, the tobacco companies recently 
prevailed in federal court in Ohio. See Barry Meier, Verdict Backs 
Cigarette Makers in Suit by Union Health Funds, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 
1999, at A10. 
 
3. Although the tobacco companies and state attorneys general have 
reached an agreement resolving the state suits, the litigation 
surrounding these cases is apparently far from over. See, e.g., Ann 
Belser & Mark Belko, County Files Suit Against Tobacco, Pitt. Post- 
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In the present case, the Funds have brought federal claims 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. S 1962, and the antitrust laws, 15 
U.S.C. S 1. Their complaint also includes, under the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1367, state- 
law claims for misrepresentation, breach of special duty, 
unjust enrichment, negligence, strict liability, and breach of 
warranty. The Funds seek both damages and extensive 
injunctive relief requiring the defendants to disclose any 
research on smoking that they have concealed, engage in a 
public education campaign to reduce smoking, cease 
advertising their products to minors, and fund smoking- 
cessation programs. 
 
The Funds allege, inter alia, that the tobacco companies 
conspired to suppress research on safer tobacco products, 
defrauded health care providers and payers by informing 
them that the companies' tobacco products were safe, and 
caused smokers to become ill by preventing the 
dissemination of smoking-reduction and smoking-cessation 
information. All of these actions allegedly caused the costs 
of smoking-related illnesses to be shifted from their proper 
source, the tobacco companies, to the plaintiff Funds (and 
others). This shift in costs purportedly was accomplished 
through the intentional and fraudulent actions of the 
tobacco companies, directed at both smokers and the 
Funds themselves. 
 
Seeking to recover for these costs, the Funds filed suit in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
in August 1997. Shortly thereafter, the defendants moved 
to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gazette, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1 (noting that Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, had filed suit against the tobacco companies in federal 
court at the same time it was seeking in state court to block final 
approval of the settlement by the attorneys general). In addition, the 
federal government appears poised to act. See  White House Office of 
Communications, FY2000 Budget Summary and Supporting Materials 
(Feb. 1, 1999), available in 1999 WL 42060, at *46 ("To recover these 
losses [from tobacco-related health problems], the U.S. Department of 
Justice intends to bring suit against the tobacco industry, and the 
budget provides $20 million to pay for necessary legal costs."). 
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Procedure 12(b)(6), and, in an order accompanied by an 
unpublished opinion, the District Court granted the motion. 
See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-5344, 1998 WL 212846 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 22, 1998). The Court relied on two general grounds to 
dismiss the entire complaint, and invoked a number of 
additional rationales to reject the Funds' specific claims. 
First, it held that plaintiffs did not state a claim because of 
"the general rule [that] has long been established that one 
who pays the medical expenses of an injured party does not 
have a direct claim against the tortfeasor who caused the 
injury." Id. at *1. The District Court decided, however, that 
it "need not dwell upon this issue," as the Funds' claims 
"suffer from an even more fundamental flaw, namely, the 
fact that plaintiffs have not suffered any cognizable 
damages." Id. at *2. The District Court reasoned that the 
Funds' increased costs for smoking-related illnesses caused 
them no injury because "plaintiffs are merely handling the 
payments with money provided by others, and have no 
genuine stake in the matter," id., and"cannot claim to have 
suffered any economic loss in the form of lost profits," id. at 
*3. 
 
The District Court also dismissed the complaint because 
(1) plaintiffs "allege no injury of the sort the antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent"; (2) the Funds' common-law 
fraud claims "are entirely too speculative to be taken 
seriously"; (3) plaintiffs "simply do not have legal standing 
to advance" claims for injunctive relief; (4) the state special- 
duty claim is "restricted to `physical harm' " that plaintiffs 
do not allege they suffered; and (5) the Funds' unjust 
enrichment claim "is simply a subrogation claim expressed 
in different language." Id. at *3-*4. Plaintiffs filed a timely 
notice of appeal. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the District Court's order is 
plenary. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 
221 (3d Cir. 1998). We accept as true all factual allegations 
in the complaint and will affirm a dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) only if "it is certain that no relief can be granted 
under any set of facts which could be proved." City of 
Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 262 n.12 
(3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
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B. The Allegations and Theory of the Complaint  
 
Plaintiffs' complaint is voluminous (containing 317 
paragraphs and running to 116 pages) and detailed in its 
explication of the history of the tobacco companies' alleged 
wrongdoing. By now, this history is well-known to the 
public at large, though plaintiffs rely heavily on the fact 
that the defendants successfully conspired to cover up their 
wrongdoing for almost five decades. This conspiracy was 
allegedly directed at both smokers and the plaintiff Funds 
themselves. Therefore, plaintiffs aver, they are both indirect 
and direct victims of the defendants' wrongful conduct. 
 
1. The Indirect Injury 
 
The Funds' indirect injury allegedly arises from the fact 
that they paid millions of dollars for the smoking-related 
medical expenses of Fund participants whom they say were 
victimized by the tobacco companies' conspiracy and fraud. 
The defendants respond that this indirect claim is simply a 
traditional subrogation claim dressed up in treble-damages 
federal statutory clothing. They invoke the general principle 
that an insurer's only claim against a tortfeasor for the 
insurer's costs arising out of wrongdoing against an insured 
is by way of subrogation. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 575 F.2d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir. 1978). 
Generally, if an insurer wishes to recover from the 
wrongdoer, it must assert the same claim--by way of 
subrogation--that the insured could have asserted against 
the wrongdoer, as well as be subject to the same defenses 
that the wrongdoer could assert in defense of the claim. The 
defendants argue that the Funds could seek to recover the 
costs of treating participants' smoking-related illnesses only 
through tort actions such as those that have been asserted 
individually by smokers. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 
2. The Direct Injury 
 
In plaintiffs' submission, notwithstanding defendants' 
argument that all of the Funds' claims are essentially 
subrogation claims, their "direct" claim is a fundamentally 
different legal claim from the typical insurer-against- 
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wrongdoer claim that falls under the principle of 
subrogation. This direct claim is said to arise not only out 
of a tortfeasor's actions toward an insured, but also from 
its actions toward the insurance company (here the Funds) 
itself. The traditional subrogation principle holds that an 
" `insurer, upon paying to the assured the amount of a loss 
of the property insured, is doubtless subrogated in a 
corresponding amount to the assured's right of action 
against any other person responsible for the loss.' " Great 
Am. Ins. Co., 575 F.2d at 1034 (quoting W. Vance, Vance on 
Insurance 787 n.2 (3d ed. 1951)). Here, the Funds are 
essentially claiming that they paid for more than"the 
property insured" (i.e., the health of fund participants) 
because the defendants caused the Funds to expend 
additional costs that would have been paid by the tobacco 
companies (through reduced revenues and tort damages) if 
they had not defrauded the Funds and conspired to cover 
up their wrongdoing. 
 
As the Funds frame their direct injury argument: "Had 
defendants not undertaken their deceptive, fraudulent, 
and anticompetitive activity, the Trusts' trustees, 
administrators, and advisors could have taken counter- 
measures against smoking and smoking-related illness and 
would have commenced legal efforts much sooner and more 
effectively to impose the costs resulting from tobacco use on 
the tobacco companies." Appellants' Br. at 10. Plaintiffs' 
complaint sets out this theory as follows: 
 
        Defendants' contract, combination, or conspiracy was 
       and is for the express purpose and effect of restraining, 
       suppressing and withholding information necessary to 
       medical care researchers, providers, and payers, 
       including Plaintiffs and members of the Class, so that 
       the costs of health care for tobacco-related illnesses 
       continue to be borne by health care providers and 
       payers, such as Plaintiffs and members of the Class, 
       [who] are injured in their business and property by, 
       among other things, having to provide or pay for the 
       health care costs of persons with tobacco-related 
       diseases without being reimbursed by Defendants. 
 
Compl. P 256. Plaintiffs correctly observe that the District 
Court did not address this alleged "direct" injury, but as is 
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clear from our discussion below, we do not find the 
directness of the Funds' alleged injury dispositive of 
whether they have stated a claim under either federal or 
state law. 
 




Plaintiffs' federal claims are based on the antitrust laws 
and the RICO statute. In brief, they allege that defendants 
conspired to withhold certain information and products 
from the Funds, and fraudulently induced the Funds to 
reimburse smokers for illnesses caused by the tobacco 
companies' wrongdoing. We need not focus on many of the 
necessary elements of these claims, such as the details of 
the conspiracy and the fraud, whether the Funds (or 
others) reasonably relied on the fraud, the predicate acts 
for the RICO claims, etc. Rather, we focus on the issue of 
proximate cause, a necessary element for bringing both 
antitrust and RICO claims, and an element we find lacking 
in plaintiffs' case. 
 
Given the Supreme Court's determination that the 
standing requirements for RICO and antitrust claims are 
similar, and that the standing analysis under these federal 
laws is drawn from common-law principles of proximate 
cause and remoteness of injury, we analyze the key 
remoteness issue for plaintiffs' federal claims under the 
rubric of standing doctrine. See Holmes v. Securities 
Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (RICO); 
Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) 
(antitrust). 
 
As is clear from our discussion below, the key problem 
with plaintiffs' complaint is the remoteness of their alleged 
injury from the defendants' alleged wrongdoing. 
Remoteness is an aspect of the proximate cause analysis, in 
that an injury that is too remote from its causal agent fails 
to satisfy tort law's proximate cause requirement--a 
requirement that the Supreme Court has adopted for 
federal antitrust and RICO claims. Cf. McCready, 457 U.S. 
at 477 ("In the absence of direct guidance from Congress, 
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and faced with the claim that a particular injury is too 
remote from the alleged violation to warrant [antitrust] 
standing, the courts are thus forced to resort to an analysis 
no less elusive than that employed traditionally by courts at 
common law with respect to the matter of `proximate 
cause.' "). By subsuming the proximate cause requirement 
under the concept of standing, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that a private plaintiff might validly plead 
(and even prove) that a defendant has committed an 
antitrust violation, but still lack standing to enjoin or 
remedy this violation if his own injury is too remotely 
connected to it. Therefore, in discussing whether plaintiffs 
have standing to bring their antitrust or RICO claims, we 
will focus on proximate cause in general and on remoteness 
in particular. 
 
Plaintiffs' claims are largely grounded in allegations of 
fraud on the part of defendants. Therefore, we would 
normally focus initially, in addressing the federal claims in 
this case, on the RICO claims, which are predicated on 
alleged mail and wire fraud by the defendants. See Compl. 
P 224(a). However, the Supreme Court has discussed 
proximate cause more expansively in the antitrust context, 
and has incorporated this discussion into its RICO 
jurisprudence. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-70. We 
therefore begin our discussion of plaintiffs' federal claims 
with an analysis of the Court's holdings in the antitrust field.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As noted above, the District Court also dismissed plaintiffs' complaint 
on the ground that the Funds have suffered no cognizable injury. See 
Steamfitters, 1998 WL 212846, at *2-*3 (finding that any increased 
expenses due to smoking-related illnesses of fund participants "merely 
meant that the unions negotiated a greater level of contributions from 
the employers"). We seriously doubt that this was an appropriate basis 
for dismissing the complaint. The plaintiffs clearly could not go at will 
to 
the employers who funded their health plans for a replenishment any 
time they needed more money. Increased costs likely necessitated 
reduced expenditures in other areas, as well as reductions in the Funds' 
reserves. Cf. Amicus Br. of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund at 22 (noting 
that the Funds cannot "merely return to the inexhaustible well of 
employers' bank accounts when the spigot for health benefits runs dry"). 
Simply because they are not the ultimate source of the money used to 
pay for smoking-related illnesses does not mean that the Funds have 
suffered no legally cognizable injury. 
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B. Antitrust Standing: Remoteness and Proximate Cause 
 
In adopting a proximate cause requirement for antitrust 
claims, the Supreme Court has explained that, despite the 
broad language and remedial purpose of the antitrust laws, 
"[i]t is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend 
to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust 
violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages 
for the injury to his business or property." McCready, 457 
U.S. at 477. In discussing the requirements for proximate 
cause, the Court has repeatedly noted that "proximate 
cause is hardly a rigorous analytic tool." Id. at 477 n.13; 
see also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State 
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536-37 & n.34 (1983); 
Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 964 
(3d Cir. 1983) ("Because of the infinite variety of claims that 
arise under the antitrust statutes, [the Supreme Court] has 
refused to fashion a black-letter rule for determining 
standing in every case."). Therefore, the Court has 
emphasized that lower courts should avoid applying bright- 
line rules and instead should analyze the circumstances of 
each case, focusing on certain key factors. 
 
1. Blue Shield v. McCready 
 
In McCready, the Court held that the primary factors for 
evaluating proximate cause in an antitrust action were: (1) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The District Court also found that all of the Funds' claims are 
essentially subrogation claims and therefore could not be brought under 
the federal and state theories invoked in the complaint. See Steamfitters, 
1998 WL 212846, at *1. Again, we do not necessarily agree with this 
conclusion. As noted supra Part I.B.2, the Funds' claims of direct injury 
are fundamentally different from a traditional insurer-against-wrongdoer 
subrogation claim. They are said to arise not only out of the wrongdoer's 
actions toward the insured, but also out of his actions directed at the 
insurer in attempting to avoid the consequences of his misdeeds. 
 
We need not resolve these issues, however, for we conclude that the 
District Court correctly held that the Funds' alleged injuries are too 
remote from any wrongdoing by the defendants to be redressable 
through the RICO statute, the antitrust laws, or state common-law 
theories of recovery. 
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"the physical and economic nexus between the alleged 
[antitrust] violation and the harm to the plaintiff" and (2) 
"more particularly, . . . the relationship of the injury alleged 
with those forms of injury about which Congress was likely 
to have been concerned in making defendant's conduct 
unlawful and in providing a private remedy" under the 
antitrust laws. McCready, 457 U.S. at 478. In discussing 
these factors (and finding that the plaintiff in McCready had 
standing to assert a claim under the antitrust laws), the 
Court noted: 
 
       The availability of [an antitrust] remedy to some person 
       who claims its benefit is not a question of the specific 
       intent of the conspirators. Here the remedy cannot 
       reasonably be restricted to those competitors whom the 
       conspirators hoped to eliminate from the market. 
       McCready claims that she has been the victim of a 
       concerted refusal to pay on the part of Blue Shield, 
       motivated by a desire to deprive psychologists of the 
       patronage of Blue Shield subscribers. Denying 
       reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment 
       was the very means by which it is alleged that Blue 
       Shield sought to achieve its illegal ends. The harm to 
       McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; 
       indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of 
       the alleged illegal conspiracy. Where the injury alleged 
       is so integral an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there 
       can be no question but that the loss was precisely the 
       type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be 
       likely to cause. 
 
Id. at 479 (emphases added) (omission in original) (internal 
quotations omitted). The Funds allege that the defendants' 
hiding of their knowledge of the dangers of smoking and 
conspiring to keep safer tobacco products from the market 
"was the very means by which [the tobacco companies] 
sought to achieve [their] illegal ends" and the Funds' 
payment of extra costs "was a necessary step in effecting 
the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy." Therefore, they 
argue, their claims fit precisely within the rule of McCready. 
 
We disagree. Unlike the defendants in McCready, the 
tobacco companies could have achieved their alleged aims 
without the existence of the Funds or the relationship 
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between the Funds and smokers. In McCready, 
psychiatrists allegedly conspired with Blue Cross to exclude 
psychologists from the psychotherapy market by 
persuading Blue Cross to reimburse subscribers for this 
service only when it was provided by a psychiatrist. The 
reimbursement scheme was both the alleged conspiracy 
and the cause of McCready's harm: McCready was a 
psychotherapy patient denied reimbursement for her 
treatment by a psychologist. If Blue Cross subscribers such 
as McCready did not exist, a conspiracy between 
psychiatrists and Blue Cross would never have come about 
(as it would have been ineffective to achieve the alleged 
aims of the conspiracy). Cf. Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern 
Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that 
plaintiff, a food broker for defendant manufacturer, had 
suffered no antitrust injury because it was not a consumer 
or competitor of defendant, and was not an "essential 
participant" in defendant's scheme to price-discriminate 
against certain retailers). 
 
In contrast, the tobacco companies would have had 
ample reason to engage in a conspiracy to prevent safer 
tobacco products from coming on the market, regardless of 
the relationship between the Funds and smokers. The very 
existence of smokers would be a sufficient reason for such 
an alleged conspiracy. The fact that the Funds reimbursed 
smokers for their smoking-related illnesses might have 
made the conspiracy more profitable or allowed it to exist 
longer, but the relationship between the Funds and 
smokers was not "a necessary step in effecting the ends of 
the alleged illegal conspiracy." 
 
It is for this reason that plaintiffs' reliance on Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 
F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1993), is also misplaced. In that case, 
which also included allegations of fraudulent acts intended 
to mislead consumers about the safety of defendants' 
product (asbestos), the district court denied defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' RICO claims. 
The court noted that "the fraud scheme directly targeted 
entities like Prudential, [a real estate dealer,] for the fraud 
would not have been worth it if large real estate dealers did 
not continue to buy such buildings." Id. at 297. In addition, 
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the plaintiffs "stood to keep the defendants' products 
valuable by continuing to buy buildings containing 
defendants' products." Id. In the present case, the tobacco 
companies' alleged fraud would still have been "worth it" if 
the Funds and other health care payers did not reimburse 
smokers for their illnesses. 
 
In addition, the defendants' fraud in Prudential prevented 
the building purchasers from obtaining information about 
the dangers of asbestos--information that would have led 
them to not purchase buildings containing this product. In 
this case, however, even if the tobacco companies had not 
prevented health care payers from discovering the dangers 
of smoking, there is no claim that the Funds would have 
chosen to not insure smokers. The defendants' conspiracy 
in McCready and the defendants' fraud in Prudential would 
have been without purpose or effect if the plaintiffs in those 
cases did not use the services of the directly targeted 
parties, psychologists and building contractors, 
respectively. The same is not true in the present case. 
 
2. Associated General Contractors 
 
a. The Relevant Factors 
 
Shortly after McCready was decided, the Supreme Court 
provided further guidance in this area in Associated 
General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) [AGC]. In AGC, a union 
sued a contractors' association on antitrust grounds, 
alleging a conspiracy to force builders and contractors to 
use primarily nonunionized subcontractors. The court of 
appeals had framed the union's argument for antitrust 
standing (which it had accepted) in much the same way 
that the Funds frame their argument here: "In support of 
the Union's standing, the [court of appeals] reasoned that 
the Union was within the area of the economy endangered 
by a breakdown of competitive conditions, not only because 
injury to the Union was a foreseeable consequence of the 
antitrust violation, but also because that injury was 
specifically intended by the defendants." Id. at 525. 
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After discussing at length proximate cause principles 
likely incorporated by Congress into the Sherman Act in 
1890, see id. at 530-34 & nn.20-25,5 the Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In addressing the key remoteness issue, the parties argue a good deal 
about the meaning of footnote 25 in AGC, but we think they place too 
much weight on the Court's citations therein to an 1882 treatise on 
damages. The relevant paragraph of the footnote reads as follows: 
 
        In torts, a leading treatise on damages set forth the general 
       principle that, "[w]here the plaintiff sustains injury from the 
       defendant's conduct to a third person, it is too remote, if the 
plaintiff 
       sustains no other than a contract relation to such a third person, 
or 
       is under contract obligation on his account, and the injury 
consists 
       only in impairing the ability or inclination of such person to 
perform 
       his part, or in increasing the plaintiff 's expense or labor of 
fulfilling 
       such contract, unless the wrongful act is willful for that 
purpose." 
       Thus, A, who had agreed with a town to support all the town 
       paupers for a specific period, in return for afixed sum, had no 
       cause of action against S for assaulting and beating one of the 
       paupers, thereby putting A to increased expense. Similarly, a 
       purchaser under an output contract with a manufacturer had no 
       right of recovery against a trespasser who stopped the company's 
       machinery, and a creditor could not recover against a person who 
       had forged a note, causing diminution in the dividends from an 
       estate. 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages 55-56 (1882) (emphasis in 
       original, footnote omitted). 
 
AGC, 459 U.S. at 532-33 n.25. Contrary to defendants' contention, the 
Court appears to have quoted this excerpt from Sutherland as simply a 
"general principle" and not as the outer limits of possible antitrust 
liability. Further, while the first example cited appears to support the 
tobacco companies' argument on remoteness, the allegations here are 
more analogous to a situation in which A agreed to support all the town 
paupers and S, after assaulting and beating a number of the paupers, 
covered up his wrongdoing and affirmatively kept A from reducing its 
costs of supporting the injured paupers. While we still question whether, 
in Sutherland's view, A would have a cause of action against S under 
this scenario, it is certainly a closer question than that raised by the 
example in the excerpt. 
 
On the other hand, plaintiffs place much weight on the qualifier at the 
end of the internally quoted language, i.e., "unless the wrongful act is 
willful for that purpose." Our view of the import of this qualifier, 
however, is not the same as theirs, as we do not think a sentence 
fragment in a single quotation in a Supreme Court footnote is sufficient 
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outlined a number of factors to consider in theflexible 
antitrust standing analysis: (1) the causal connection 
between defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's harm; (2) 
the specific intent of defendant to harm plaintiff; (3) the 
nature of plaintiff 's alleged injury (and whether it relates to 
the purpose of the antitrust laws, i.e., ensuring competition 
within economic markets); (4) "the directness or 
indirectness of the asserted injury"; (5) whether the 
"damages claim is . . . highly speculative"; and (6) "keeping 
the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially 
manageable limits," i.e., "avoiding either the risk of 
duplicate recoveries on the one hand, or the danger of 
complex apportionment of damages on the other." Id. at 
537-38, 540, 542-44.6 
 
b. Applying the AGC Factors 
 
i. Causation and Intent 
 
Although the first two factors--a causal connection and 
an intent to harm the plaintiff--were present in AGC, this 
was insufficient to give the plaintiff antitrust standing. See 
AGC, 459 U.S. at 537; see also Merican, 713 F.2d at 964 
n.13 ("Claims that a defendant specifically intended to 
harm the plaintiff, however, are not of controlling 
significance. Although a defendant's improper motive may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to override the clear text of that opinion--text that squarely holds that 
"an allegation of improper motive, although it may support a plaintiff 's 
damages claim under S 4, is not a panacea that will enable any 
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id. at 537 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
6. We take these "factors" from AGC's lengthy discussion of antitrust 
standing. However, our prior cases have at times distilled Supreme Court 
precedent in this area into a more succinct test:"To establish antitrust 
standing a plaintiff must show both: 1) harm of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent; and 2) an injury to the plaintiff which 
flows from that which makes defendant's acts unlawful." Gulfstream III 
Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 
1993). In other cases, we have extracted five relevant factors from AGC. 
See, e.g., Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 
165 
F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust 
Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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sometimes support a damages claim under S 4[of the 
Clayton Act], it `is not a panacea that will enable any 
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.' " (quoting 
AGC, 459 U.S. at 537)). Plaintiffs urge us to focus on the 
causal connection (proximate or otherwise) between the 
tobacco companies' wrongdoing and the injury to the 
Funds, as well as the companies' alleged specific intent to 
foist the costs of their wrongdoing onto the Funds. As in 
AGC, we do not find these factors to be dispositive on the 
issue of antitrust standing. See also Gregory Mktg., 787 
F.2d at 95 ("[N]either causation in this but-for sense nor an 
allegation of improper motive is sufficient to `enable any 
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.' " (quoting 
AGC, 459 U.S. at 537)). 
 
What is more, for the reasons set forth in the margin, it 
is unclear whether there exists a causal connection 
(proximate or otherwise) between any antitrust wrongdoing 
on the part of the defendants and the Funds' alleged 
injuries of increased health care expenditures.7 An 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. It is unclear from plaintiffs' complaint precisely what antitrust 
wrongdoing they allege is connected to their own injuries. See, e.g., 
Compl. P 242 (alleging defendants engaged in the "anti-competitive 
restriction of product choice and suppression of product information," 
thereby "restricting consumer choice, and causing consumers to suffer 
tobacco-related illnesses"); id. P 246 ("Defendants also conspired to 
eliminate competition among themselves in the research, development, 
production and marketing of alternative, higher quality, and safer 
cigarettes and tobacco products."). 
 
A business's decision to not produce a product, simpliciter, is not a 
violation of the antitrust laws, and it is not clear whether even a 
concerted decision among all of the businesses in an industry to keep 
one of their new products from reaching consumers would be an 
antitrust violation. Cf. Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 
838 
F.2d 360, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A line of `product innovation' cases has 
consistently rejected antitrust liability for a monopolist's decision 
about 
when or whether to market new products."); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544-46 (9th Cir. 1983). In Foremost 
Pro, the court observed that a business's decision to delay introducing a 
new product would not restrain competition, as consumers would still be 
able to choose among existing products by that business or its 
competitors. See id. at 545. The court went on to conclude: 
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agreement among competitors to suppress information on 
the dangers of their product might constitute an antitrust 
violation if the conspiracy artificially raised the price 
consumers were willing to pay for the product. Here, 
however, the plaintiffs do not allege (and could not 
plausibly allege) that consumers' paying higher prices for 
tobacco products injured the Funds. On the contrary, these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        It is appropriate to emphasize that as a general rule, "any firm, 
       even a monopolist, may . . . bring its products to market whenever 
       and however it chooses." [Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
       603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979)]. Without more, it is not unlawful 
       for any competitor in any market to delay the introduction of a new 
       product or an entire line of new products until, as[plaintiff] 
alleged 
       in this case, the competition forces such introduction. In order to 
       state a claim for relief under section 2 [of the Sherman Act], 
product 
       introduction must be alleged to involve some associated conduct 
       which constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly 
       power, or a predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to 
       monopolize the relevant market, rather than aggressive competition 
       on the merits. 
 
Id. at 545-46 (omission in original). 
 
We do not decide here whether this reasoning holds true when 
competitors--rather than a single monopolist--agree to "delay the 
introduction of a new product or an entire line of new products," but it 
is at least unclear whether such an agreement would constitute an 
antitrust violation absent allegations that the delayed introduction of 
the 
product involved an attempt to artificially raise prices for existing 
products, exclude non-conspiring competitors from a market, or 
accomplish some other conventional anticompetitive effect. See, e.g., 
United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 335-37 (1969) 
(noting that, while an agreement to exchange price information would be 
a "conspiracy" under the Sherman Act, it would constitute an antitrust 
violation only if it restrained trade, by, for example, limiting or 
reducing 
price competition); cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 
781, 809 (1946) ("It is not the form of the combination or the particular 
means used but the result to be achieved that the statute condemns."). 
While we do not decide whether an agreement among competitors to 
withhold a new product from a market would constitute an antitrust 
violation, we assume for the sake of assessing plaintiffs' antitrust 
standing that the conduct in which defendants allegedly engaged would 
constitute such a violation. 
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higher prices more likely would have led fewer persons to 
purchase the products, thereby decreasing the costs (and 
injuries) to the Funds. Therefore, while there may be a 
causal relationship between the conduct of the defendants 
and the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs, we are uncertain 
that these injuries are connected to any conduct of the 
defendants that violates the antitrust laws. See supra note 
7. 
 
ii. Nature and Directness of Injury 
 
In analyzing the third and fourth factors, the Court in 
AGC observed that the plaintiff union was neither a 
consumer (as the plaintiff in McCready was) nor a 
competitor within the market that allegedly had been 
restricted (i.e., the market for building subcontracts). 
Further, its alleged harm was indirect because it claimed 
that the defendants conspired to induce third parties to do 
business with nonunion contractors instead of union 
contractors, and the plaintiff union was harmed only 
because it had contracts with the latter and not the former. 
The Court concluded that "the Union is neither a 
participant in the market for construction contracts or 
subcontracts nor a direct victim of the defendants' coercive 
practices." AGC, 459 U.S. at 540 n.44. This analysis 
inveighs against plaintiffs' position.8  The Court's holding in 
AGC that the union did not have standing also undercuts 
the Funds' argument that the foreseeability of their injury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Funds contend that there is an exception to the general rule that 
an antitrust plaintiff be either a consumer or competitor of the 
defendant's. See Appellants' Br. at 42-45. It is true that, drawing on 
language from McCready, 457 U.S. at 483-84, we have sometimes 
expressed the injury requirement in terms of the harm being 
"inextricably intertwined" with the defendant's wrongdoing. See, e.g., 
Gulfstream III Assocs., 995 F.2d at 429 (holding that plaintiff's injury 
may flow from defendant's wrongdoing if "there exists a `significant 
causal connection' such that the harm to the plaintiff can be said to be 
`inextricably intertwined' with the antitrust conspiracy" (citation to 
McCready and other cases omitted)). The simple invocation of this 
phrase, however, will not allow a plaintiff to avoid the fundamental 
requirement for antitrust standing that he or she have suffered an injury 
of the type--almost exclusively suffered by consumers or competitors-- 
that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 
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strongly favors our finding that proximate cause exists 
here. See Appellants' Br. at 25. No doubt the defendants in 
AGC foresaw that their conspiracy favoring nonunion 
contractors would harm the unions that had contracts with 
the target of the conspiracy--unionized contractors. Yet this 
foreseeability was insufficient to overcome the remoteness 
of the union's injury from the defendants' wrongdoing. 
 
Our analysis of the first four AGC factors counsels 
against recognition of the Funds' claims based simply on 
indirect cost increases from smoking-related illnesses. The 
Funds are not consumers forced to pay higher prices for 
tobacco products or competitors harmed by defendants' 
ability to conceal the unsafe nature of their products. They 
are simply some of the many groups or individuals 
suffering the financial or medical repercussions of the 
decades-long marketing of a product that we now know is 
demonstrably unsafe. Cf. Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("If the injury is not of the requisite type, even though 
the would-be plaintiff may have suffered an injury as a 
result of conduct that violated the antitrust laws, he or she 
has no standing to bring a private action under the 
antitrust laws to recover for it."). 
 
However, the Funds' claims of direct injury include 
allegations that they were in the market for safer tobacco 
products or for products that would reduce or prevent 
people from smoking. Therefore, these claims might meet 
the third factor from AGC. If the Funds were consumers in 
a market for information and products that would have 
reduced their expenditures (because they allegedly would 
have provided the information and products to their 
participants, some of whom would have smoked less and 
become less ill), their asserted injuries--as consumers-- 
may be of the appropriate type. 
 
The Funds' claims of direct injury might also meet the 
fourth factor from AGC, which focuses on the directness or 
indirectness of the alleged injury. Subsumed in the 
"directness" factor is also the issue of whether other, more 
directly injured parties could vindicate the policies 
underlying the antitrust laws: "The existence of an 
identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would 
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normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in 
antitrust enforcement diminishes the justification for 
allowing a more remote party such as the Union to perform 
the office of a private attorney general." AGC, 459 U.S. at 
542. While more directly injured parties existed in AGC 
(i.e., unionized subcontractors who were the target of the 
boycott), this is not necessarily the case here. Smokers can 
sue for personal injuries arising from smoking, but they are 
unlikely (or unable) to press antitrust claims against the 
tobacco companies. 
 
Although we acknowledge that plaintiffs' claims of direct 
injury appear, at least initially, to meet a number of the 
first four AGC factors, we question whether these direct 
injuries are necessarily more direct than the indirect 
injuries on which much of our discussion has focused. 
Under plaintiffs' direct theory, the tobacco companies' 
conduct aimed at the Funds induced the Funds to not take 
certain actions, which led to a greater incidence of smoking 
(and of smokers using more dangerous products), which led 
to more illness, which led to increased health care 
expenditures being borne by the plaintiffs. Although the 
alleged wrongdoing was more directly aimed at the Funds, 
the injury itself certainly was no more direct than the 
indirect injury that arose from the defendants' actions 
toward smokers. 
 
In another union fund case, a district court focused on 
this alleged direct injury in partially denying the 
defendants' motion to dismiss. In that case, the court 
analogized the direct-injury claim to a hypothetical case in 
which a defendant fraudulently induced health funds into 
reimbursing participants for a dangerous medical 
procedure that then harmed these participants. See New 
Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. 
Supp. 2d 324, 332-33 (D.N.J. 1998). In such a case, the 
court believed, the funds would have a cause of action 
against the defendant for their economic damages caused 
by the fund participants' use of the procedure that the 
funds were wrongfully induced to cover. 
 
We are not convinced, as the district court in New Jersey 
Carpenters was, that this hypothetical case presents a 
causation chain similar to the Funds' direct claim in the 
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present case. First, in the hypothetical case, the defendant 
fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to spend money that 
redounded directly to defendant's benefit (i.e., the funds 
paid for the procedure that the defendant invented). In a 
sense, this is no different than a garden-variety fraud case 
in which the defendant hoodwinks the plaintiff into giving 
him "money for nothing." In the present case, plaintiffs' 
direct-injury claim is that the tobacco companies 
fraudulently induced the Funds to not spend money (on 
safer-smoking or smoking-cessation products) that, if 
spent, would have diminished a separate revenue stream 
(i.e., smokers' purchase of tobacco products) for the 
defendants. We view this as an indirect connection. In 
addition, in the New Jersey Carpenters hypothetical, the 
fraud essentially induced the plaintiffs to enter into the 
relationship that caused their injury: The defendant 
induced the plaintiffs to "cover" the cost of defendant's 
faulty procedure. In the present case, the relationship that 
links the smokers' illnesses with the Funds already exists: 
The plaintiffs are already (apart from anything the tobacco 
companies do) "covering" the costs of the smokers' 
illnesses. The alleged fraud simply prevents them from 
reducing their expenses arising out of this preexisting 
relationship. 
 
Our belief that the plaintiffs' direct claim comes no closer 
than their indirect claim to meeting the proximate cause 
requirement for antitrust standing is supported by the 
dearth of discussion of this allegedly unique claim in 
plaintiffs' complaint and brief to this Court. See Appellants' 
Br. at 21-22 (discussing "direct" injury); id. at 23-39 
(discussing "indirect" injury); see also infra note 11 (noting 
minimal allegations of "direct" injury in complaint). At all 
events, as is clear from our extensive review of all of the 
AGC factors, we find that however plaintiffs characterize 
their claims--as direct or indirect--they necessarily fail for 
being too remotely connected in the causal chain from any 
wrongdoing on defendants' part. 
 
iii. Speculativeness of Damages and Trial Complexity 
 
We find that AGC's sixth factor does not militate against 
a finding of antitrust standing, as there is little danger of 
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duplicative litigation9 or complex apportionment of damages 
among various groups of plaintiffs.10 However, the Funds' 
damages claims are quite speculative (and very difficult to 
measure), implicating AGC's fifth factor. The Funds argue 
that damages may be easily calculated by aggregation and 
the application of statistical models. We question how easy 
this process would be. The Funds' alleged damages are said 
to arise from the fact that the tobacco companies prevented 
the Funds from providing smoking-cessation or safer- 
smoking information to their participants, some of whom 
would have allegedly quit smoking or begun smoking safer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The defendants complain that allowing the Funds to recover for their 
health care expenditures creates a danger of duplicative recovery in 
general (if not duplicative antitrust or RICO damages), because of 
Pennsylvania's collateral source rule. See, e.g. , Johnson v. Beane, 664 
A.2d 96, 100 (Pa. 1995) ("The collateral source rule provides that 
payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the damages 
otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer."). The collateral source rule, 
however, is aimed at preventing a tortfeasor from benefitting from a third 
party's payment to the injured party. If the tortfeasor himself has 
already 
paid a portion of the injured party's damages, his own liability is 
correspondingly reduced. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts 
S 920A(1) (1979). We are uncertain how this latter principle would apply 
when the tortfeasor pays a portion of the injured party's damages 
indirectly--i.e., through the third party payer's separate action against 
the tortfeasor for recovery of the third party's payments to the injured 
party. We need not predict whether Pennsylvania courts would apply the 
collateral source rule in this context, however, as we do not rely on 
defendants' invocation of the rule to support our holding. 
 
10. However, to the extent that Fund participants have not been 
reimbursed for certain health care expenditures or have suffered some 
other pecuniary loss as a result of the tobacco companies' alleged 
conspiracy, they could bring their own antitrust claims (as well as 
personal injury claims) against the defendants. For example, as we noted 
supra at 22-24 & note 7, it is possible that the defendants were able to 
artificially increase the price of their products by conspiring to hide a 
major defect in these products and by inducing consumers to buy their 
products through fraudulent claims regarding their safety. While we have 
questioned the Funds' ability to state a claim for higher priced tobacco 
products, consumers who paid these higher prices would possibly be 
able to bring an antitrust or RICO claim. Therefore, to some minimal 
extent at least, an apportionment of damages between health care payers 
and smokers might be necessary. 
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products, reducing their smoking-related illnesses, and 
thereby lowering the Funds' costs for reimbursing smokers' 
health care expenditures. In order to calculate the damages 
--i.e., the costs not lowered due to the antitrust conspiracy 
--the Funds must demonstrate how many smokers would 
have stopped smoking if provided with smoking-cessation 
information, how many would have begun smoking less- 
dangerous products, how much healthier these smokers 
would have been if they had taken these actions, and the 
savings the Funds would have realized by paying out fewer 
claims for smoking-related illnesses. 
 
It is apparent why the Funds argue that they can 
demonstrate all of this through aggregation and statistical 
modeling: it would be impossible for them to do so 
otherwise. Cf. Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 
127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of class 
certification in statewide smokers' suit, because "addiction, 
causation, the defenses of comparative and contributory 
negligence, the need for medical monitoring and the statute 
of limitations present too many individual issues to permit 
certification"). Yet we do not believe that aggregation and 
statistical modeling are sufficient to get the Funds over the 
hurdle of the AGC factor focusing on whether the "damages 
claim is . . . highly speculative." AGC, 459 U.S. at 542. 
 
In some litigation contexts, there is a meaningful 
distinction between damages that are completely incapable 
of determination and those that are difficult to determine 
but are nonetheless measurable. In those contexts, if the 
latter is the case, aggregation and statistical modeling may 
be appropriate (though we need not decide that issue here) 
to allow plaintiffs to overcome the difficulty of proving the 
amount of damages. Cf. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 
767, 782-87 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing use of aggregation 
and statistical analysis to determine compensatory 
damages). But cf. Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 
469, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting use of statistical 
evidence to overcome need to prove individual damages in 
putative class action). In the present context, however, a 
finding of antitrust standing must precede a finding of 
liability, which itself precedes the assessment of damages. 
Therefore, the fact that "once liability is established, 
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plaintiff's proof of damages will be evaluated under a more 
lenient standard," Danny Kresky Enters. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 
206, 212 (3d Cir. 1983), does not eliminate from our 
analysis of the AGC factors the speculative (though 
potentially measurable) nature of plaintiffs' damages. This 
speculativeness strongly militates against plaintiffs' 
position. 
 
iv. The AGC Factors Applied: Summary  
 
Against this somewhat lengthy background, we can now 
summarize our review of the AGC factors in this case: First, 
some causal connection appears to exist between the 
conduct of the tobacco companies and the injury suffered 
by the plaintiff Funds--though we doubt that this 
connection links some antitrust wrongdoing with an 
antitrust injury. Second, plaintiffs have alleged, if barely, 
that the defendants' conspiracy specifically targeted them, 
though for the most part their complaint alleges that the 
plaintiffs were targeted along with "consumers, state and 
federal governments, medical and health care entities, and 
the public at large." Compl. P 244.11 Third, at least some 
aspect of the plaintiffs' alleged injury--their inability to 
obtain and use information on the dangers of smoking or 
on smoking-cessation methods--may be of the type that the 
antitrust laws are intended to prevent, i.e., the restriction of 
consumer choices, which leads to increased costs for these 
consumers. However, the tenuous causal connection, the 
sketchy allegations of defendants' intent to target the 
Funds, and the minimal extent to which plaintiffs' injuries 
relate to the purposes of the antitrust laws are all 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Plaintiffs rely, both in attempting to distinguish their claims from 
traditional subrogation claims and in their efforts to avoid the import of 
AGC, on the alleged direct targeting of the Funds by the tobacco 
companies. Yet, we find scant mention of this direct targeting in 
plaintiffs' lengthy complaint and, when specifically asked by us to cite 
portions of the complaint that address this aspect of their case, 
plaintiffs 
could muster only three arguably relevant paragraphs (out of 317). See 
Appellants' Letter Br. of Jan. 25, 1999, at 2. While plaintiffs urged us, 
at oral argument, to remand so that they might amend their complaint 
to include more specific allegations of direct targeting by the 
defendants, 
see Tr. of Oral Argument at 18-19, we decline to do so, as the possibly 
inadequate pleading is not a factor in our holding. 
 
                                30 
  
substantially outweighed by the fourth AGC factor, the 
indirectness of the asserted injury. 
 
The sheer number of links in the chain of causation that 
connect the defendants' suppression of information on the 
dangers of their products and withholding of safer tobacco 
products from the market to the Funds' increased 
expenditures are greater than in any case we canfind in 
which this court or the Supreme Court has found antitrust 
standing. These alleged links include the following: (1) the 
tobacco companies engaged in a conspiracy to suppress 
information and withhold products from the market; (2) the 
Funds were prevented from informing their members about 
the dangers of smoking and the availability of less 
dangerous products; (3) smokers continued to smoke 
dangerous tobacco products that they would not have 
otherwise used (or would have used less); (4) smokers 
contracted more smoking-related illnesses; and,finally, (5) 
the Funds suffered increased expenses due to their 
reimbursement of smokers' health care costs. 
 
As to the final two AGC factors, there is only a slight 
possibility of duplicative antitrust recoveries or problems 
apportioning antitrust damages, because smokers are 
unlikely to make their own antitrust claims based on 
increased health care expenditures. However, the Funds' 
damages claims are highly speculative and would entail 
complex calculations potentially involving numerous 
individuals not party to this case, i.e., Fund participants 
who do smoke or have smoked in the past. 
 
The short of it is that, while we find that the plaintiffs' 
antitrust claims barely meet certain AGC factors, the 
fulfillment of these factors is greatly outweighed by the 
extremely indirect nature of the Funds' injuries and the 
highly speculative and complex damages claims. The 
tortured path that one must follow from the tobacco 
companies' alleged wrongdoing to the Funds' increased 
expenditures demonstrates that the plaintiffs' claims are 
precisely the type of indirect claims that the proximate 
cause requirement is intended to weed out. Cf. Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, 
J., dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word `proximate' 
is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough 
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sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series 
of events beyond a certain point."). 
 
What is more, in proposing a solution to the speculative 
nature of their damages--i.e., using aggregation and 
statistical modeling to measure damages--the Funds focus 
too far down the road to assist their case for standing: The 
task of accurately measuring damages can be approached 
only after a plaintiff has met the requirements for standing 
and has proven liability. While we do not doubt that the 
Funds have paid out more in health care expenditures than 
they would have in the absence of tobacco products, 
"Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially 
affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to 
recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or 
property." McCready, 457 U.S. at 477. 
 
3. Lower Lake Erie 
 
Our own precedent that provides the most support for 
plaintiffs' antitrust claim is In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litigation, 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993). In that 
case, the district court dismissed for lack of antitrust 
standing one of plaintiffs' claims that was based on a 
theory similar to that put forth by plaintiffs here. The 
plaintiffs, various steel manufacturers and transportation 
companies, alleged that certain railroad companies 
conspired "to preclude potential competitors from entering 
the market of lake transport, dock handling, storage and 
land transport of iron ore." Id. at 1151. The steel 
companies' claim that was dismissed was "based on the 
theory that had the conspiracy not delayed the use of self- 
unloading vessels, the steel companies would have paid 
vessel companies a lower rate for lake transportation." Id. 
at 1154. The district court found that this claim failed, 
reasoning that "because the steel companies were only 
potential customers of non-conspiring competitors, (the 
vessel companies), damages could be ascertained only by 
speculating when the vessel companies would have begun 
using self-unloaders absent a conspiracy. Assessment of 
damages would also require additional conjecture related to 
the rates the private docks would have charged to handle 
the self-unloaders." Id. 
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After analyzing the factors from AGC, we disagreed with 
the district court's conclusion. First, we found that a direct 
causal relationship existed between the defendants' 
wrongdoing and the steel companies' alleged harm: 
"[D]elayed . . . introduction of the more efficient self- 
unloader . . . caused loss of the profits which would have 
been realized had the less costly transport system been in 
place," and "it was unquestionably the steel companies who 
bore the brunt of the increased costs attributed to the 
railroad's agreement to thwart development of the less 
expensive technology." Id. at 1168.12 This matches closely 
the Funds' theory in the present case: Delayed introduction 
of safer tobacco products caused higher costs than they 
would have faced had these products been allowed to enter 
the market, and it was health care payers who bore the 
brunt of the increased costs attributed to the tobacco 
companies' agreement to thwart development of safer 
tobacco products. 
 
There is a key difference, however. In Lower Lake Erie, 
the use of more expensive unloaders--made necessary by 
the defendants' wrongdoing--caused a loss of profits for the 
plaintiffs without any intervening events.13 The inability to 
use cheaper unloaders, in and of itself, caused the 
plaintiffs' damages. Here, the alleged conspiracy that 
delayed introduction of safer tobacco products only caused 
damages to the plaintiff Funds after working its way 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We also found that the steel companies had alleged injuries of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that the existence 
of other parties with similar injuries did not "diminish the directness of 
the steel companies' injury." Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1168-69. Our 
ultimate holding was that the plaintiffs' damages, arising from the 
conspirators' exclusion of lower-cost means of transportation from the 
market, conferred antitrust standing on the steel companies. 
 
13. We note another key difference between Lower Lake Erie and the 
present case. In Lower Lake Erie, the defendants did not simply conspire 
to delay their own introduction of a new product, as is alleged here. 
Rather, they engaged in archetypal antitrust conduct (price-fixing, 
boycotts, refusals to sell, etc.) in order to prevent other parties in the 
unloader market from introducing and using self-unloaders. See Lower 
Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1153-54. There was no question, therefore, that 
specific antitrust wrongdoing could be linked to specific antitrust 
injury. 
Cf. supra note 7. 
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through another party (i.e., smokers) and at least two more 
steps: First, without safer products or information on 
smoking-cessation, smokers continued to smoke dangerous 
tobacco products. Next, these smokers became more ill 
than they otherwise would have without the tobacco 
companies' alleged conspiracy. Only at this point did the 
Funds allegedly suffer damages from the increased costs of 
the smokers' illnesses. 
 
This distinction between Lower Lake Erie and the present 
case illustrates the most fundamental flaw in plaintiffs' 
claims. The injuries that they allegedly suffered from 
defendants' wrongdoing are simply too remote from that 
wrongdoing to be cognizable under the antitrust laws. The 
causal links that plaintiffs must connect in order to make 
their case are just too numerous and too speculative to 
meet the requirements of AGC and of the Supreme Court's 
and this court's other antitrust precedents. 
 
C. RICO Claims: Holmes v. SIPC 
 
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 
258 (1992), the Supreme Court held that its discussion of 
proximate cause and remoteness in cases such as 
McCready and AGC applied to the analysis of proximate 
cause in RICO cases as well. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; 
see also McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 
(3d Cir. 1996) ("Significantly, antitrust standing principles 
apply equally to allegations of RICO violations."). Therefore, 
much (if not all) of what we have said above in our 
discussion of antitrust standing applies to the Funds' RICO 
claims. We discuss here, however, the specific requirements 
for stating a claim under RICO, to better explicate our 
reasons for finding that all of plaintiffs' claims must fail for 
being too remote and speculative. 
 
In Holmes, the Court addressed the directness inquiry 
when it explained that "a plaintiff who complained of harm 
flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third 
person by the defendant's acts was generally said to stand 
at too remote a distance to recover." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
268-69. This was primarily because (1) the more indirect 
the injury, "the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the 
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amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to[defendant's 
wrongdoing], as distinct from other, independent, factors"; 
(2) allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties would 
require complicated rules for apportioning damages; and (3) 
direct victims could generally be counted on to vindicate 
the policies underlying the relevant law. Id. at 269-70. 
 
1. Directness of the Injury 
 
The plaintiff in Holmes alleged that the defendants had 
conspired to manipulate certain stock prices, which led to 
losses for brokers, which led to the brokers' inability to 
return investments of customers who had not bought the 
manipulated stock.14 In the present case, the tobacco 
companies are in the position of the stock manipulators in 
Holmes, while the smokers--the third party linking the 
plaintiffs and defendants--are in the same position as the 
brokers; the plaintiff Funds, who suffered a loss because of 
the harm that the defendants brought upon the third party, 
are in the same position as the brokers' customers who did 
not invest in the manipulated stock.15  The Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The plaintiff in Holmes was actually a private nonprofit corporation, 
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC"), which was 
required by federal law to reimburse the losses of certain investors. 
After 
paying for the losses of investors who had not invested in the defrauded 
securities, the SIPC asserted claims against those engaged in the fraud, 
as a subrogee. In discussing the causation chain in Holmes, we omit this 
additional link, as the SIPC stood in the investors' shoes for purposes of 
its claims. 
 
15. In the present case, the allegations of fraud and conspiracy directed 
at the Funds themselves might make the Funds more like the brokers' 
customers who did buy the manipulated stock. The Court in Holmes 
noted that these customers might have a RICO claim against the 
defendants, though it declined to reach this issue. See Holmes, 503 U.S. 
at 272 n.19. We note, however, that the defrauded investors in Holmes 
would have been able to allege direct injury from the fraud (i.e., their 
losses derived directly from the fraud, without any intervening links), 
while the Funds here, even if they were direct targets of the tobacco 
companies' fraud, did not suffer damages until this fraud prevented 
them from encouraging their participants to smoke less or not at all, 
which led to an increased incident of smoking-related illnesses, which in 
turn led to the Funds' increased expenses. See supra at 26-27. 
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in Holmes held that the causal connection between the 
nonpurchasing investors and the stock manipulators was 
too attenuated for the plaintiffs to have RICO standing. 
 
The Court reasoned as follows: "If the nonpurchasing 
customers were allowed to sue, the district court would first 
need to determine the extent to which their inability to 
collect from the broker-dealers was the result of the alleged 
conspiracy to manipulate, as opposed to, say, the broker- 
dealers' poor business practices or their failures to 
anticipate developments in the financial markets." Id. at 
272-73. Applied to the present case, if the Funds are 
allowed to sue, the court would need to determine the 
extent to which their increased costs for smoking-related 
illnesses resulted from the tobacco companies' conspiracy 
to suppress health and safety information, as opposed to 
smokers' other health problems, smokers' independent (i.e., 
separate from the fraud and conspiracy) decisions to 
smoke, smokers' ignoring of health and safety warnings, etc.16 
As in Holmes, this causation chain is much too speculative 
and attenuated to support a RICO claim. 
 
2. Apportionment of Damages and Vindication by Oth ers 
 
As noted above, the Court in Holmes expressed two 
further concerns (in addition to the directness factor) that 
supported its conclusion that nonpurchasing investors did 
not have standing: (1) the court would need to apportion 
treble damages between the brokers and the nonpurchasing 
customers, and (2) the brokers could vindicate the RICO 
claims themselves. See id. at 273. As we noted in our 
discussion of the Funds' antitrust claims, more directly 
injured parties, i.e., smokers, would be unlikely to bring 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. While this complex determination militates against allowing the 
Funds to bring their remote claim, it addresses one of defendants' 
objections, that allowing the Funds (rather than smokers) to bring claims 
for smoking-related illnesses would nullify the defendants' traditional 
defenses, such as assumption of risk and comparative negligence. These 
defenses presumably would be available in the present case, in the sense 
that smokers' own wrongdoing (or ignoring of known risks) would be a 
factor in establishing and measuring the link between the tobacco 
companies' actions and the Funds' damages. 
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federal claims against the tobacco companies for the same 
damages claimed by the Funds. Yet, as we also noted 
above, Fund participants who have not been fully 
reimbursed for their out-of-pocket costs that are traceable 
to defendants' alleged fraud and conspiracy might bring 
RICO or antitrust claims. Therefore, as in Holmes, a court 
adjudicating the Funds' RICO claims would need to 
consider the appropriate apportionment of damages 
between smokers and others such as the Funds who 
suffered economic losses as a result of the tobacco 
companies' alleged fraudulent acts. 
 
It is true that the final concern--that another party could 
better vindicate the RICO claims--may not be as fully 
applicable to this case as to Holmes because the Funds 
allege that they suffered far greater economic damages than 
smokers themselves, many of whom were reimbursed for 
their direct pecuniary losses. Yet we are unconvinced that 
this distinction is sufficient to overcome the concerns about 
apportioning damages and, most fundamentally, the 
remoteness of the Funds' alleged RICO injuries from any 
wrongdoing on the part of the tobacco companies. Cf. 
Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 
494, 521 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding RICO standing when 
defendant targeted plaintiff 's contractual partner, 
plaintiff's injury arose from loss of that contract, and that 
contractual relationship "was a direct target of the alleged 
scheme--indeed, interference with that relationship may 
well be deemed the linchpin of the scheme's success").17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Because of our conclusion that plaintiffs' RICO and common-law 
fraud claims fail for lack of proximate cause, we need not reach 
defendants' alternative argument that these claims were not pled with 
sufficient particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of 
fraud 
. . ., the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with 
particularity."). We note, however, that plaintiffs' allegations are 
fairly 
general in nature and do not include "specific allegations as to which 
fraudulent tactics were used against" specific plaintiffs. Rolo v. City 
Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 659 (3d Cir. 1998). On the 
other hand, we have cautioned that courts should "apply the rule with 
some flexibility and should not require plaintiffs to plead issues that 
may 
have been concealed by the defendants," id. at 658, as is alleged to have 
happened here. 
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D. Summary of Federal Claims 
 
At this point in contemporary history, there can be little 
doubt that the tobacco companies' products have caused 
smokers to contract certain illnesses and that the plaintiff 
Funds (and others) have borne some of the costs of these 
illnesses by reimbursing their participants for their health 
care expenditures. It is therefore quite possible that some of 
these health care providers and payers have had to cut 
back on their coverage of other medical problems in order 
to fund the costs of smoking-related illnesses, causing 
other Fund participants to pay out-of-pocket expenses they 
otherwise would not have paid. It also may be the case that 
unions and their members have been forced to accept lower 
wage increases or to forgo benefit improvements in order to 
achieve contract settlements with employers that included 
sufficient contributions to the Funds to pay for smoking- 
related illnesses. All of these parties--non-smoking Fund 
participants, unions, union members, employers--can 
claim to have suffered some injury arising out of the 
tobacco companies' conduct. At some point, however, the 
causal link between defendants' actions and the negative 
effects that eventually result is not proximate enough to 
meet the prudential requirements for antitrust or RICO 
standing. In this case, for the reasons set forth supra at 17- 
37, we believe that this necessary proximate-cause 
connection is missing.18 Therefore, plaintiffs' federal claims 
based on alleged violations of the antitrust laws and the 
RICO statute were properly dismissed by the District Court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. There is arguably a tension between our decision here that the 
tobacco companies cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by 
entities that paid for smoking-related illnesses, and the fact that these 
same tobacco companies recently agreed to pay more than $200 billion 
to settle claims brought by attorneys general for the states' similar 
costs 
of their citizens' smoking-related illnesses. We note in this regard that 
an 
explanation for the putative tension may be found in any number of 
places, including state laws conferring standing and broad rights of 
recovery on states for wrongdoing against their citizens or their coffers, 
as well as the political power of governmental bodies--and the threat of 
legislative action--that is lacking in this case brought by private 
entities. 
We need not, of course, engage these matters here. 
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III. Plaintiffs' State-Law Claims 
 
The same principles that lead us to conclude that 
plaintiffs' antitrust and RICO claims were properly 
dismissed lead to the inevitable conclusion that their state- 
law claims must also fail. 
 
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
 
While the District Court dismissed the Funds' remaining 
claims for the same reasons it found the antitrust and 
RICO claims wanting, i.e., lack of proximate cause and lack 
of cognizable injury, it also dismissed them for claim- 
specific reasons. The District Court found plaintiffs' state- 
law fraud claims too speculative to be cognizable. See 
Steamfitters, 1998 WL 212846, at *3. Just as we have 
found the link between defendants' alleged fraud--providing 
false information regarding the safety of their products-- 
and plaintiffs' alleged injuries too attenuated to support a 
RICO claim, we also find the link too remote to support a 
common-law fraud claim. See Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 
889 (Pa. 1994) (requiring proximate cause as an element of 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim); see also Crawford v. 
Pituch, 84 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa. 1951) (holding that 
recoverable damages in a fraud case do not include those 
that are "consequential, speculative and even conjectural," 
but "only such as can be said to have been the immediate 
and proximate consequences of the deceit practiced upon 
the plaintiffs").19 For this reason, we agree with the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We recently held that a common-law fraud claim might succeed 
despite the fact that the fraudulent misrepresentation was made to a 
third party (as is true in the present case for the Funds' claims of 
indirect injury). See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 
F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 1998). In Orthopedic Bone Screw, we held that "the 
mere fact that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation was made to [a 
third party] and not the plaintiffs does not necessarily preclude a 
finding 
of legally sufficient causation," id. at 826, when the plaintiffs alleged 
that 
fraud on the third party (a government agency) led to approval of 
products that then were used by plaintiffs and caused them injuries. Id. 
at 827. We also held that a misrepresentation claim is not necessarily 
precluded when the alleged injury arises from a third party's (and not 
the plaintiff 's) reliance on defendant's misrepresentations. See id. at 
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Court that plaintiffs cannot maintain their state fraud 
claims. 
 
B. Injunctive Relief 
 
If the plaintiffs have antitrust standing for their damages 
claim, they almost certainly would have standing to seek 
injunctive relief, as the standard is lower for such a claim. 
See McCarthy, 80 F.3d at 856 (only proximate cause and 
"threatened loss or injury cognizable in equity" are required 
for injunctive relief under the antitrust laws). However, as 
we have detailed above, the necessary element of proximate 
cause is missing and therefore, just as plaintiffs lack 
standing to seek damages for their alleged injuries, they 
lack antitrust standing for equitable relief as well.20 
 
C. Special Duty 
 
The defendants maintain, and the District Court held, 
that a special-duty claim in Pennsylvania requires 
averments of physical injury. Whether or not this view is 
correct (and we take no position on it),21  we conclude that 
plaintiffs' special-duty claim too must fail. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
828-29. These holdings, however, do not help plaintiffs in the present 
case. Even if the fact that the tobacco companies' misrepresentations 
were made primarily to smokers is not sufficient to defeat the common- 
law fraud claims, the harm that flowed from this fraud is much more 
attenuated than that in Orthopedic Bone Screw, in which the plaintiffs 
were directly harmed by their use of a product that was only available 
because of the defendants' misrepresentations to the third party. 
 
20. This court has yet to decide whether injunctive relief is available 
for 
a private party under RICO. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. 
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1355 (3d Cir. 1989). Other circuits are split 
on this issue. See Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1296 & n.8 (5th Cir. 
1994) (detailing circuit split). Given the lack of proximate cause in this 
case, the remoteness of plaintiffs' alleged injury from defendants' 
alleged 
wrongdoing, and our holding that plaintiffs' damages claims do not 
survive defendants' motion to dismiss, we need not reach this issue in 
the present case. 
 
21. The Pennsylvania Superior Court case relied on by the District Court 
and the defendants for the proposition that a special-duty claim requires 
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Special-duty claims arise most often in the context of the 
provision of public or commercial services. See, e.g., Yates 
v. City of Philadelphia, 578 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990) ("[A] special relationship is found only where an 
individual is exposed to a special danger and the 
authorities have undertaken the responsibility to provide 
adequate protection for him or her . . . ."); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts S 323 (1965) ("One who undertakes, 
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of the other's person or things, is subject to 
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered 
because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking."); see 
also Morena v. South Hills Health Sys., 462 A.2d 680, 684 
(Pa. 1983) (adopting Restatement section 323(a) as the 
applicable law in Pennsylvania). 
 
Converting a company's marketing into a special 
undertaking to inform the public about the known risks of 
its products would subject every manufacturer that 
advertises its products to liability for a "special duty" 
created by such marketing, and that duty would be violated 
by every material omission in such advertising. We are 
unwilling to so dramatically extend the scope of liability for 
a state-law cause of action. Cf. DeJesus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 223 A.2d 849, 850 (Pa. 1966) (holding that no special 
duty arises from workers' compensation insurance 
company's "advertising material representing that it 
provides loss prevention service and safety counsel to its 
policyholders" when plaintiff-worker did not aver that "the 
advertisements were part of any contract or other legal 
obligation undertaken by [the insurance company] or that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
allegations of personal physical injury did not so hold. See Lower Lake 
Dock Co. v. Messinger Bearing Corp., 577 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990) (noting that prior Pennsylvania cases applying the special-duty 
rule did so only when there was physical injury or damages to property 
other than the allegedly defective one). We believe that the law on this 
issue is more uncertain in Pennsylvania than the defendants claim. 
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they adversely affected [the plaintiff]"). 22 Finally, a special- 
duty claim is effectively a negligence cause of action, and 
therefore requires the element we have found missing from 
plaintiffs' case, proximate cause. See Morena, 462 A.2d at 
684 & n.5 (noting that the plaintiff in a special-duty case 
must still prove the underlying elements of a negligence 
claim, including proximate cause). 
 
D. Unjust Enrichment 
 
Unjust enrichment is typically invoked in a quasi- 
contractual setting, when plaintiff seeks to recover from 
defendant for a benefit conferred under an unconsummated 
or void contract. See, e.g., Zvonik v. Zvonik, 435 A.2d 1236, 
1239-40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); cf. Meehan v. Cheltenham 
Township, 189 A.2d 593, 595 (Pa. 1963) (noting that unjust 
enrichment is an equitable remedy, requiring for recovery 
that there be both "(1) an enrichment, and (2) an injustice 
resulting if recovery for the enrichment is denied"). 
 
In the tort setting, an unjust enrichment claim is 
essentially another way of stating a traditional tort claim 
(i.e., if defendant is permitted to keep the benefit of his 
tortious conduct, he will be unjustly enriched). As the 
Restatement of Restitution puts it: 
 
       The desirability of permitting restitution in [tort] cases 
       is ordinarily not so obvious as in the cases where there 
       has been no tort since the tortfeasor is always subject 
       to liability in an action for damages and . . . the right 
       to maintain an action for restitution in such cases is 
       largely the product of imperfections in the tort 
       remedies, some of which imperfections have now been 
       removed. 
 
Restatement of Restitution S 3 cmt. a (1937); see also id. at 
ch. 7 introductory note ("Actions of tort are ordinarily not 
restitutionary . . . . They are based primarily upon 
wrongdoing and ordinarily, through the payment of money, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Of course, a company's failure to inform consumers about the known 
risks of its products would be relevant to the duty-to-warn aspect of a 
products liability claim. See Restatement (Second) of Torts S 402A cmt. 
j (1965). 
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compensate the injured person for the harm suffered by 
him as a result of the wrongful conduct, irrespective of the 
receipt of anything by the defendant."). We can find no 
justification for permitting plaintiffs to proceed on their 
unjust enrichment claim once we have determined that the 
District Court properly dismissed the traditional tort claims 
because of the remoteness of plaintiffs' injuries from 
defendants' wrongdoing.23 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment 




23. The District Court did not specifically address plaintiffs' strict 
liability, negligence, and breach-of-warranty claims, but these claims 
fail 
as well, for each requires a proximate connection between the 
defendants' conduct and the plaintiffs' injuries, a connection we find 
missing in this case. See, e.g., Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 
190 (Pa. 1997) ("To recover under [strict liability], a plaintiff must 
establish . . . that the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff 's 
injuries . . . ."); Skipworth ex rel. Williams v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 
A.2d 
169, 172 (Pa. 1997) ("Pennsylvania . . . follows the general rule that a 
plaintiff, in order to recover, must establish that a particular 
defendant's 
negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries."); AM/PM Franchise 
Ass'n v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915, 923 n.12 (Pa. 1990) ("As 
with all cases involving breach of warranty, the plaintiff is charged with 
the burden of proving that the defendant's breach is the proximate cause 
of the harm suffered."). 
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Super. Ct. May 27, 1997) (denying motion to dismiss) 
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duty, and indemnity claims) 
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dismissing unjust enrichment, special duty, fraud, 
breach of warranty, negligence, strict liability, and 
conspiracy claims with leave to amend) 
 
City & County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. 
Supp. 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing RICO, negligent 
misrepresentation, special duty, warranty, and unjust 
enrichment claims with leave to amend), and No. C-96- 
2090 DLJ, 1998 WL 230980 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1998) 
(denying motion to dismiss fraud and certain special duty 
claims, but dismissing other special duty claims) 
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Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. 
Tex. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss RICO claims, but 
dismissing antitrust, unjust enrichment, and nuisance 
claims) 
 
Washington v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 
SEA, 1996 WL 931316 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996), 
and 1997 WL 714842 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 1997) 
(denying motion to dismiss state antitrust claims, but 
dismissing special duty and unjust enrichment claims) 
 
Union Funds as Plaintiffs 
 
Hawaii Health & Welfare Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97-00833 SPK (D. Haw. Jan. 25, 
1999) (dismissing RICO, antitrust, false advertising, and 
special duty claims) 
 
International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 734 Health & Welfare 
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., __ F. Supp. 2d __, Nos. 
97-C-8113 & -8114, 1998 WL 849528 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 
1998) (dismissing antitrust, special duty, strict liability, 
negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, unjust enrichment, 
and conspiracy claims) 
 
Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 771 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (denying 
motion to dismiss RICO, antitrust, and conspiracy 
claims) 
 
Kentucky Laborers Dist. Council Health & Welfare Trust 
Fund v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. 
Ky. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss some RICO and 
deceit claims, but dismissing other RICO claims and 
antitrust, fraud, special duty, and unjust enrichment 
claims) 
 
Laborers & Operating Eng'rs Util. Agreement Health & 
Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CIV 97-1406 
PHX SMM (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 1999) (dismissing RICO, 
antitrust, fraud, assumed duty, and unjust enrichment 
claims) 
 
Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y.) (denying motion to 
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dismiss fraud, special duty, and RICO claims, but 
dismissing unjust enrichment and antitrust claims), 
interlocutory appeal granted, 7 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-7944 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 
4, 1999) 
 
National Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
23 F. Supp. 2d 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying motion to 
dismiss RICO, unjust enrichment, indemnity, and 
assumed duty claims) 
 
New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 
F. Supp. 2d 324 (D.N.J. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss 
certain fraud and RICO claims, but dismissing antitrust, 
special duty, and unjust enrichment claims) 
 
New Mex. & West Tex. Multi-Craft Health & Welfare Trust 
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CV-97-09118 (N.M. Dist. 
Ct. Dec. 24, 1998) (dismissing all claims) 
 
Northwest Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., No. C97-849WD (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 
1998) (denying motion to dismiss) 
 
Operating Eng'rs Local 12 Health & Welfare Trust v. 
American Tobacco Co., No. BC 177968 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
July 9, 1998) (dismissing strict liability, special duty, 
breach of warranty, restitution, and unjust enrichment 
claims without leave to amend, and dismissing fraud and 
conspiracy claims with leave to amend) 
 
Operating Eng'rs Local 324 Health Care Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., No. 97-741291 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 12, 
1999) (dismissing all claims) 
 
Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Or. 1998) 
(dismissing antitrust, RICO, consumer protection, unjust 
enrichment, indemnity, assumed duty, and conspiracy 
claims) 
 
Seafarers Welfare Plan v. Philip Morris, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 
623 (D. Md. 1998) (dismissing RICO, antitrust, tort, 
consumer protection, and unjust enrichment claims) 
 
Southeast Fla. Laborers Dist. Health & Welfare Trust Fund 
v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 97-8715-CIV-RYSKAMP, 1998 
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WL 186878 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 1998) (dismissing fraud, 
special duty, unjust enrichment, RICO, and antitrust 
claims) 
 
Stationary Eng'rs Local 39 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., No. C-97-01519 DLJ, 1998 WL 476265 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1998) (denying motion to dismiss 
negligent breach of special duty claim, but dismissing 
fraud claims with leave to amend, and dismissing RICO, 
antitrust, intentional breach of special duty, unfair trade, 
and unjust enrichment claims without leave to amend) 
 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., __ F.3d __, No. 98-1426 (3d Cir. Mar. 1999) 
(affirming dismissal of RICO, antitrust, fraud, special 
duty, unjust enrichment, strict liability, negligence, and 
breach of warranty claims) 
 
Texas Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
21 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (dismissing RICO, 
antitrust, tort, breach of warranty, and unjust 
enrichment claims) 
 
West Va. Laborers' Pension Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
No. 3:97-0708 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 12, 1998) (denying 
motion to dismiss) 
 
West Va.-Ohio Valley Area I.B.E.W. Fund v. American 
Tobacco Co., No. 2:97-0978 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 11, 1998) 
(denying motion to dismiss) 
 
Other Health Care Payers as Plaintiffs 
 
Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 
1996) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss state 
antitrust, consumer protection, and equitable claims, but 
dismissing tort claims)24 
 
Regence Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C98-559R, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1820 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 1999) 
(dismissing RICO, antitrust, fraud, special duty, unjust 
enrichment, and conspiracy claims) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. --Although the State of Minnesota is the nominal plaintiff in this 
case, the state supreme court's decision addressed only those claims 
brought by Blue Cross. 
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Williams & Drake Co. v. American Tobacco Co., No. 98-553 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1998) (dismissing RICO, antitrust, 
consumer protection, fraud, special duty, indemnity, and 
unjust enrichment claims brought by self-insured 
employer) 
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